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ARBITRATION, WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?* 
Thomas O. Main† 
In the lead piece of this symposium, Hensler and Khatam bring into relief 
two paradoxes in contemporary arbitration policy and practice.1 First, arbitra-
tion is beset by hyperspecialization into segmented domains, yet is plagued by re-
forms that transcend those boundaries. Second, arbitration seeks all the virtue of 
formal adjudication without the process, yet process is the principal virtue of 
formal adjudication. 
Hensler and Khatam invite readers to think broadly about contemporary ar-
bitration policy and practice. Accepting that invitation, I briefly explore four are-
as of inquiry that can be reduced to the interrogatives Why?, What?, When?, and 
Who?, respectively. All four questions locate arbitration within the larger dispute 
resolution architecture.2 
I. WHY?: THE EXISTENTIAL QUESTION 
In the past forty years, arbitration has grown like kudzu vine.3 The stems 
and tendrils of arbitration have attached to and climbed all surfaces of contem-
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1  Deborah R. Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the 
Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Line Between Private and 
Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. L.J. 381, 381 (2018). 
2  Although I try to consider arbitration broadly “across [its] domains” in this piece, the ca-
pacities of my knowledge and the limits of experience tend to restrict my focus to federal, as 
opposed to state dispute resolution. See id. at 382. Also, because I am unfamiliar with the 
particulars of investor-state arbitration, I am subject to Hensler and Khatam’s criticism that 
scholars are regrettably siloed. See id. at 386. 
3  Kudzu is a notoriously fast-growing, climbing vine. See Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme 
Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 92 
& n.1 (2012) (quoting Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 828 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999)). It would be more precise to say that arbitration clauses have 
grown like kudzu vine. Because so few people with claims actually arbitrate, the number of 
arbitration proceedings is relatively modest. Compare CFPB Arbitration Agreements, 82 
Fed. Reg. 33210, 33221 (July 19, 2017) (noting Study’s finding that “arbitration agreements 
are commonly used in contracts for consumer financial products and services,”) with id. at 
33254 (noting Study’s finding that a “small number of consumers filed consumer financial 
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porary life—affecting transactions and occurrences large and small, whether 
profound or trivial, both public and private.4 But unlike kudzu, which is part of 
a fairly uniform genus, the many species of arbitration are heterogeneous.5  
Arbitration can be extremely informal or highly formal. It can be non-binding, 
employ informal procedures, and apply customary norms or intuitive notions of 
justice. [Or it] can resemble a court proceeding with formal adversarial presenta-
tions and the application of substantive rules of law to achieve a binding judg-
ment.6 
Indeed, arbitration has few, if any essential qualities.7  
Importantly, this diversity is not the result of some pathology; rather, it is 
arbitration’s professed virtue. Promoters of arbitration hail the process because 
it is infinitely flexible and can be tailored for different types of disputes.8 But 
                                                                                                                                 
claims in arbitration”). See also Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses 
Prevent Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 87–
88 (2012) (discussing when “consumers’ claims are suppressed or eliminated altogether as a 
result of companies’ use of mandatory arbitration clauses”). 
4  See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging 
and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (2008); Jessica Sil-
ver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, A ‘Privatization of the Justice System’: In Arbitration, a 
Bias Towards Business, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at A1. 
5  An “arbitration” could be a proceeding between a consumer and a manufacturer occurring 
in a suburban office park, a proceeding between two multinational corporations in the Lon-
don Court of Arbitration, or a proceeding between a French bank and the Republic of Burki-
na Faso in an ICSID proceeding Washington, D.C. See generally Hensler & Khatam, supra 
note 1, at 381 (identifying three domains of arbitration). 
6  Douglas Yarn, The Death of ADR: A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism Through Institu-
tionalization, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 929, 934–35 (2004). In addition to the differences enu-
merated in the block quote in the text, arbitration may be voluntary or involuntary. Disputes 
may come before one arbitrator or a panel of three (or some other number of) arbitrators. 
Arbitrations may or may not be court-annexed. “Baseball” or “final offer” arbitration, for 
example, may constrain the set of possible resolutions of the dispute. The arbitrator(s) may 
or may not have subject-matter expertise in the subject matter of the dispute—and they may 
or may not be attorneys. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL VII 
(2007); David L. Erickson & Peter Geoffrey Bowen, Two Alternatives to Litigation: An In-
troduction to Arbitration and Mediation, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2005–Jan. 2006, at 43–44 
(2006). See also Stephen J. Choi et al., Attorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 
110–11 (2010) (describing the use of “industry arbitrators”). 
7  See Michael A. Landrum & Dean A. Trongard, Judicial Morphallaxis: Mandatory Arbi-
tration and Statutory Rights, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 345, 357 (1998) (noting that the Su-
preme Court “blurs the essential qualitative differences” between adjudication and arbitra-
tion); Niall Mackay Roberts, Note, Definitional Avoidance: Arbitration’s Common-Law 
Meaning and the Federal Arbitration Act, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1559 (2016) (“Arbi-
tration is undefined in federal law. In their haste to serve the purposes and objectives of the 
[Federal Arbitration Act], federal courts rarely pause to consider a definition.”). Hensler and 
Khatam offer a conventional definition of arbitration, which excludes little: “[A] binding 
adjudication of a dispute by private decision-makers outside a public court system.” Hensler 
& Khatam, supra note 1, at 387 (citing Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of 
ADR: An Argument That the Term ADR Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 97 (2000)). 
8  See generally William W. Park, Arbitration’s Protean Nature: The Value of Rules and the 
Risks of Discretion, 19 ARB. INT’L 279 (2003); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public 
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this divergent evolution of arbitral practices complicates any effort to engage in 
a serious discussion of “arbitration” as a mode of dispute resolution. Accord-
ingly, I take a wide arc around the particulars—or essence—of arbitration, and 
instead begin with a precedent why question about the existence of arbitration.9 
In all its manifold and diverse forms, arbitration is often cast as a competi-
tor or alternative to adjudication.10 To be sure, arbitration seeks “business in 
the form of disputes” formerly processed by courts, which are, in some sense, a 
rival.11 But, this characterization suggests that arbitration has a separate and in-
dependent existence. And that narrative subtly masks—even subverts—an im-
portant truth: the enterprise of arbitration presupposes the existence of a formal 
system.  
States have a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force; only gov-
ernments have the authority to vindicate rights and to assign responsibilities.12 
To the extent that arbitration participates in the resolution of disputes, it does so 
not only with the state’s blessing, but also with its assistance. Without the in-
frastructure provided by formal institutions (namely courts and legislatures13), 
                                                                                                                                 
in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 
2804 (2015) (recognizing flexibility as a principal virtue of arbitration); Judith Resnik, The 
Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793 (2014). 
9  By invoking the terms existence and essence I am not intending to take a side in a grand 
philosophical debate. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ESSAYS IN EXISTENTIALISM 35–36 (1965) (not-
ing that “[e]xistence precedes essence,” expressing the notion that humans live and only then 
conceptualize). I am addressing the ordered sequence of the concepts, not their fundamental 
separability. 
10  For commentary discussing how arbitration competes with courts, see Erin O’Hara 
O’Connor & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration, the Law Market, and the Law of Lawyering, 38 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 87, 90–91 (2014); Paul Rose, Developing a Market for Employment 
Discrimination Claims in the Securities Industry, 48 UCLA L. REV. 399, 423 (2000). For 
commentary discussing how courts (especially specialized courts) compete with arbitration, 
see Christopher R. Drahozal, Business Courts and the Future of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 491–92 (2009); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the 
Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 50 n.277 (1997). 
11  Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 
1, 47 (1987). 
12  Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, reprinted in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGY 77, 77–78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946); “Weber did not 
mean that others do not use force in a modern state, but that all legitimate force is either 
wielded by the state itself or by its permission or delegation. . . . This is a normative not a 
factual monopoly. We may, of course, defy the state; but within the context of law—and that 
is our context today—we may not do so lawfully.” Charles Fried, Perfect Freedom, Perfect 
Justice, 78 B.U. L. REV. 717, 739 (1998). 
13  In the international context, treaties create the requisite state authority; in the United 
States, treaties signed by the President must be ratified by the Senate. See, e.g., Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between State and Nationals of Other States 
(“ICSID”), opened for signature Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 (entered into force Oct. 14, 
1966) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1650–1650a); The Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”), opened for signature June 
18 NEV. L.J. 457, MAIN - FINAL 3/27/18  3:16 PM 
460 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:457  
participation in arbitration would be optional,14 arbitrators would have no 
meaningful authority,15 and arbitration awards would be non-binding and unen-
forceable.16 Thus, at its core, the enterprise of arbitration enjoys neither subjec-
tive agency nor self-determination.17 To paraphrase Maitland, arbitration with-
out courts would be a “castle in the air, an impossibility.”18 
                                                                                                                                 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (entered into force June 7, 1959) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–
208). 
14  Parties who enter into arbitration agreements could renege and instead file formal actions; 
instead, courts compel arbitration. See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 
103–04 (2012); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223 (1985). 
15  Arbitral proceedings lack the accoutrements of power that effective dispute resolution re-
quires. So courts issue injunctive relief, subpoenas, and contempt orders as adjuncts, often 
with legislative countenance. 
The arbitrators . . . may summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a 
witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper 
which may be deemed material as evidence in the case. . . . Said summons shall issue in the 
name of the arbitrator . . . and shall be directed to the said person and shall be served in the same 
manner as subpoenas to appear and testify before the court; if any person or persons so sum-
moned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey said summons, upon petition the United States 
district court for the district in which such arbitrators . . . are sitting may compel the attendance 
of such person or persons before said arbitrator . . ., or punish said person or persons for con-
tempt in the same manner provided by law for securing the attendance of witnesses or their pun-
ishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the courts of the United States. 
9 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). See also Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
749 F.2d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The fact that a dispute is to be arbitrated . . . does not ab-
solve the court of its obligation to consider the merits of a requested preliminary injunc-
tion”); Lever Bros. Co. v. Int’l Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 117 (4th 
Cir. 1976) (enjoining party from relocating its plant pending the outcome of the arbitration). 
16  Parties who prevail in arbitration could find those awards meaningless; instead, courts 
enforce those arbitral awards. See, e.g., Comprehensive Acct. Corp. v. Rudell, 760 F.2d 138, 
140 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[O]nce a matter has gone through arbitration and an award has been 
issued, the grounds on which a court asked to confirm (enforce) the award can refuse to do 
so are limited. . . .”). See also United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 
38 (1987) (“Courts . . . do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator”); 
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (arbitra-
tors “have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to 
appellate review.”); Baxter Int’l., Inc. v. Abbot Labs., 315 F.3d 829, 832 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 
(1985)) (observing that allowing parties to raise arguments at the enforcement stage “would 
just be another way of saying that [the matter is] not arbitrable” and that “[t]he arbitral tribu-
nal in this case ‘took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.’ Ensuring 
this is as far as our review legitimately goes.”). To be sure, there are circumstances where 
social norms may be strong enough to encourage compliance with an arbitrator’s award and 
discourage resort to the state. See, e.g., Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration 
Decisions Made by Muslim Religious Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J.L. 
& RELIGION 379, 383–84 (2009) (discussing religious prohibitions on the use of secular 
courts); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 124–26 (1992). 
17  See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and 
ADR in Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 681, 697–99 (2005). Scholars have ex-
plored this point when considering the extent to which arbitration is “state action.” See gen-
erally Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dis-
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Arbitration is thus not a competitor nor even an alternative to formal adju-
dication; rather it is a partner of formal adjudication.19 State support is why ar-
bitration exists: arbitration thrives with it, and would wither without it. This is 
important for two reasons. First, it means that the formal system must accept 
responsibility for any of arbitration’s shortcomings vis-à-vis its citizens. Se-
cond, the state need not regulate arbitrators or arbitration proceedings directly, 
but instead could focus on where arbitration interfaces with (and requires the 
assistance of) courts.20 
II. WHAT?: THE OBJECTIVE 
The state’s monopoly over the coercive use of force to resolve disputes is 
important because the resolution of disputes is a necessary public service. As a 
public utility provides the necessities of water or electricity, the state is respon-
sible for the infrastructure that provides the public service of dispute resolution. 
Although one should never mistake the government for a business,21 the classic 
public utility is a useful framework for thinking about the state’s broad role 
with respect to providing dispute resolution services.  
First, like water, public dispute resolution is a shared, limited resource.22 
There is a finite number of judges, staffers, courtrooms, and hours. And as wa-
ter utilities must resolve the competing demands of farmers, commercial users, 
                                                                                                                                 
pute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1997); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitu-
tionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of 
Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
18  F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 19 (A. H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker 
eds., rev. ed. 1936) (“Equity was not a self-sufficient system, at every point it presupposed 
the existence of common law. Common law was a self-sufficient system. . . . Equity without 
common law would have been a castle in the air, an impossibility.”). 
19  See Vicki Zick, Comment, Reshaping the Constitution to Meet the Practical Needs of the 
Day: The Judicial Preference for Binding Arbitration, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 247, 247 (1998) 
(describing arbitration as the courts’ “junior varsity justice system”). 
20  Reference to “the state” in this context means primarily the federal government, because 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts conflicting state laws. See Kindred Nursing 
Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 
U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406–07 
(1967). For history and context about the FAA, see generally Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or 
Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 
WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996). 
21  Scholars credit Columbia University political scientist Wallace Sayre for saying: “Public 
and private management are fundamentally alike in all unimportant respects.” See generally 
Graham T. Allison, Public and Private Management: Are They Fundamentally Alike in All 
Unimportant Respects?, in CLASSICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 387 (Jay M. Shafritz & 
Albert C. Hyde eds., 7th ed. 2012). See John J. DiIulio, Jr., Measuring Performance When 
There Is No Bottom Line, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 142, 142–43 (1993), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pmcjs.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4WN-7DYN]. 
22  See Thomas O. Main, Procedural Constants: How Delay Aversion Shapes Reform, 15 
NEV. L.J. 1597, 1605 (2015) (“The courts are a shared public resource that provides a forum 
for the resolution of disputes.”). 
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and residents, courts must resolve the competing demands of criminal/civil 
caseloads, pro se litigants, and high-/low-dollar cases. Further, both water utili-
ties and courts must manage current demand for their resource while also safe-
guarding it for future consumers.  
At the same time, however, public utilities are often obliged to provide 
universal access. Running miles of electrical lines to serve one rural consumer 
can be exorbitantly expensive—and extremely “inefficient”—for an electric 
utility. Yet universal access is the expectation. Consider, then, what would uni-
versal access to dispute resolution look like? Naturally, arbitration could be part 
of that picture. 
III. WHEN?: THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
The question for policymakers is: When is arbitration an appropriate meth-
od of dispute resolution? Because we cannot test possible answers to that ques-
tion under precise experimental conditions, the best available data may be his-
tory. History, albeit an imperfect laboratory, can be instructive. Hensler and 
Khatam survey much of the relevant history,23 so I discuss just one more case 
to offer perspective on the when question. 
For most of American history, courts viewed arbitration skeptically.24 This 
was—and, in fact, still is—a sensible position: If all the accoutrements of for-
mal adjudication (including judges, courts, and formal procedures) are not es-
sential to fair and effective dispute resolution, then why do we have them at 
all?25 Engrained with this view, courts were hostile to efforts that purported to 
oust them of their responsibility to vindicate rights and to assign responsibili-
ties; the judicial function was at stake.26 This sentiment began to change, how-
                                                        
23  See Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at 387-400. 
24  See Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1251–52 
(2011). 
25  Edward Manson’s statement, quoted by Hensler and Khatam, assumes that arbitration can 
“have all the virtues which the law lacks” even though the price of those virtues are the 
costs, complexity, and adversarialism that he is trying to avoid. See Hensler & Khatam, su-
pra note 1, at 401 (quoting Edward Manson, The City of London Chamber of Arbitration, 9 
LAW Q. REV. 86, 86 (1893)). 
26  See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1974) (noting that Federal Arbi-
tration Act, enacted in 1924 reversed “centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration”); W. H. 
Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 214 P. 38, 39 (Cal. 1923) (outlining arbitration agreements as un-
enforceable when used to “oust the legally constituted courts of their jurisdiction and set up 
private tribunals”); C. Edward Fletcher, III, Privatizing Securities Disputes through the En-
forcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 394 n.5 (1987) (citing Hurst v. 
Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868) (recognizing courts as the only proper forum for the res-
olution of legal controversies)). The judicial function includes showing fidelity to the under-
lying substantive law. When a court declines to assert jurisdiction, the failure to vindicate 
those substantive rights raises separation-of-powers questions. This notion has long dogged 
arbitration doctrine, characterizing it as a form of improper judicial law-making. See gener-
ally Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (“We have no more right to decline the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the 
other would be treason to the constitution.”). See also Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separa-
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ever, with Congressional legislation in 1925 that, in turn, led to a string of Su-
preme Court cases, including two decisions in the early 1970s, that chiseled an 
inflection point with respect to the treatment of arbitration clauses.27 
In M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Supreme Court validated a fo-
rum selection clause in a contract between U.S. and German parties that identi-
fied London as the situs of litigation.28 Enforcement of the clause meant that 
party autonomy could properly oust courts of their power to resolve the parties’ 
dispute.29 Notably this decision denied an American party access to American 
courts; the company’s only recourse for redress was to travel abroad.30 Al-
though The Bremen involved a forum-selection clause rather than an arbitration 
clause, the Court, two years later in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., held that ar-
bitration clauses are but “a specialized kind of forum-selection clause.”31 Ac-
cordingly, The Bremen is the taproot of our kudzu vine.32 
As we ponder broad questions about when arbitration is appropriate, it is 
instructive to revisit the facts of The Bremen. These facts, after all, persuaded 
                                                                                                                                 
tion of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 74–75 (1984) (ar-
guing that federal courts cannot abstain from cases that fall within Congressionally-
conferred jurisdiction). 
27  United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 (1925). In 1947, this legislation was reenacted 
and codified by Congress and given its more familiar name the Federal Arbitration Act. See 
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947). The two Supreme Court cases are introduced in note 26, supra, and note 
28, infra. 
28  M/S Bremen v. Zapata Shore Co. (The Bremen), 407 U.S. 1, 2, 3, 10 (1972) (recognizing 
forum selection clauses as “prima facie valid”). 
29  Id. at 10 (recognizing legacy of ouster doctrine and citing collection of cases supporting 
that view in “Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 300, 306–20 (1957), and Later Case Service (1967)”). 
30  The international nature of this case elevated the consequences of enforcing the clause. 
Although eight years earlier the Court had upheld the validity of forum-selection clauses in 
the domestic context, The Bremen is the seminal case for the enforcement of forum-selection 
clauses. See generally S. I. Strong, Limits of Procedural Choice of Law, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L 
L. 1027, 1040 (2014) (“Although the Court had already upheld the validity of forum selec-
tion clauses in the domestic context, The Bremen was the first case to address such provi-
sions in the international realm.”) (citing Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 
311, 315–16 (1964)). 
31  See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518–19 (discussing The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1). See also Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 698 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing); Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534 (1995). 
32  Although The Bremen precedent is limited by its facts to admiralty facts federal courts 
applied The Bremen to a variety of federal questions. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 2–3. See Lin-
da S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory 
Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 293–96 (1988). See generally H. Al-
len Blair, Promise and Peril: Doctrinally Permissible Options for Calibrating Procedure 
Through Contract, 95 NEB. L. REV. 787, 823 (2017) (describing how “The Bremen revolu-
tionized private procedural ordering”); David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure 
by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of 
Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1095 (2002) (referring to The Bremen as a 
“sea-change” in the law). For a more nuanced account of The Bremen’s place in the devel-
opment of party-autonomy jurisprudence, see David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Proce-
dure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
973, 988–94 (2008). 
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the Supreme Court to view respect for party autonomy as more important than 
adhering to its tradition of ensuring that parties could access the courts (or, put 
another way, more important than adhering to its tradition of ensuring that the 
law would be enforced).33 In The Bremen, a Texas oil company, Zapata Off-
Shore Company, contracted with a German company, Unterweser Reederei, 
GmBH, to transport The Chaparral, Zapata’s oil-drilling rig, from Louisiana to 
a location off the coast of Italy.34 During the tow, a severe storm in the Gulf of 
Mexico damaged the rig, causing its legs to break off.35 At Zapata’s direction, 
Unterweser’s deep-sea tug, The Bremen, towed the rig from international wa-
ters to Tampa Bay, Florida.36 
The Texas oil company brought an admiralty suit in a Florida federal court 
seeking $3.5 million in damages against Unterweser for negligence and breach 
of contract.37 Relying on the forum-selection clause in their contract, the de-
fendant moved to dismiss the suit. Both the trial court and, later, the Circuit 
Court, instead sided with the Texas oil company, refusing to enforce a clause 
that would oust the courts of jurisdiction.38 
In its landmark decision, the Supreme Court enforced the clause.39 Six key 
facts framed that decision: 
• This transaction was “far from routine.”40 It contemplated “the tow 
of [an oil-drilling rig, an] extremely costly piece of equipment,” to 
a destination six thousand miles away.41 
• The contract was an “arm’s-length [transaction] by experienced 
and sophisticated businessmen” with “equal . . . bargaining stat-
ure.”42 
                                                        
33  See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10. 
34  Id. at 2. 
35  Id. at 3. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. at 3–4. The action was brought in admiralty against Unterweser in personam and 
against the tugboat in rem. See Jonathan M. Gutoff, Attaching Domestic Assets to Remedy 
High Seas Pollution: Rule B and Marine Debris, 22 ROGER WILLIAMS. U. L. REV. 432, 433 
(2017) (“Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime and Asset Forfeiture 
Actions provides for something many law students and practitioners who recall first-year 
civil procedure will assume to have vanished: quasi in rem jurisdiction over defendants in 
cases within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts.”). 
38  The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 6–7. 
39  In fact, the Court vacated the lower court’s order and remanded the case to the district 
court “for further proceedings consistent with [its] opinion.” Id. at 20. But this is a techni-
cality that no longer seems relevant. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V 
Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 537 (1995) (observing that in The Bremen, the Court “enforced a 
foreign forum selection clause”); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 1, 64 n.258 (1991) (noting that, in The Bremen, “the Court enforced” the clause); Mi-
chael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 55 (1992). 
40  The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. at 12 & n.21. 
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• The contract was actually negotiated.43 
• This clause “was clearly a reasonable effort to bring vital certainty 
to this international transaction[.]”44 This uncertainty was as re-
markable as it was imminent, and in this sense, the clause “was a 
vital part of the agreement.”45 
• This clause “was clearly a reasonable effort . . . to provide a neu-
tral forum experienced and capable in the resolution of admiralty 
litigation.”46  
• The claim involved the breach of a private agreement.47 
In sum, then, for the (1) uncommon transaction (2) where commercial par-
ties (3) freely negotiate a contract with an arbitration clause (4) where the 
clause resolves profound uncertainty about the situs of litigation that bedevils 
both parties, (5) their selection of a neutral arbiter (6) for the resolution of dis-
putes about a private agreement should be respected. 
With the kudzu vine released into the wild, however, the enforcement of 
arbitration clauses did not remain limited to these narrow circumstances. Some 
additional historical context might help explain arbitration’s sudden popularity. 
In 1972, the year of The Bremen, many federal judges were anxious about the 
growth of their civil caseloads. This anxiety turned to panic when, over the 
course of the long decade between 1969 and 1983, civil caseloads more than 
tripled.48 The number of district judges increased too, but not at the same rate; 
in fact, during this same period, “[T]he average civil caseload of each federal 
judge doubled.”49 This pressure led to a number of judicially-inspired reforms 
to ration scarce judicial resources. Among those reforms was a bigger role for 
arbitration.50 
                                                        
43  Rather than using preprinted form bills of lading, Zapata solicited bids and Unterweser 
prepared a draft contract. Zapata proposed “several changes” to the contract and Unterweser 
ultimately accepted those changes. Id. at 3, 12. 
44  Id. at 17. The Chaparral could have been damaged at any point along the route. “Manifest-
ly much uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit 
could be maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident might occur or if jurisdiction 
were left to any place where The Bremen or Unterweser might happen to be found.” Id. at 
13. 
45  Id. at 14. 
46  Id. at 17. 
47  Id. at 12–13. 
48  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-1 (1970–1979). 
49   Main, supra note 22, at 1600 (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL 
REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 
tbl. C-1 (1970–1979)). 
50  See Sternlight supra note 20, at 660–61(characterizing the notion that there is a longstand-
ing judicial philosophy favoring arbitration as a “myth” rooted in the Court’s desire to con-
serve judicial resources); see also Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at 388-89 & n.32. The 
characterization of arbitration as, primarily, a caseload-clearing device is a bastardization of 
arbitration’s supposed virtues. See generally Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 329, 354–74 (2005) (collecting authorities re: cost savings to parties, procedural 
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Since the 1970s, the Court has allowed arbitration to sprawl. Courts now 
enforce arbitration clauses (1) in routine transactions51 (2) involving customers 
and other vulnerable parties,52 who (3) entered into contracts of adhesion53 (4) 
where the choice of arbitration had nothing to do with resolving uncertainty,54 
(5) the drafter of the clause chose the arbitrator,55 and (6) the claims concerned 
                                                                                                                                 
flexibility, substantive flexibility, expertise, finality, procedural justice, party autonomy, re-
inforcement of community norms, and access to justice). 
51  See Sajida A. Mahdi, Gateway to Arbitration: Issues of Contract Formation Under the 
U.C.C. and the Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses Included in Standard Form Contracts 
Shipped with Goods, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 403, 403 (2001) (describing the use of standard form 
contracts in “ordinary, routine commercial transactions”); Michael J. Mustill, Arbitration: 
History and Background, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 43, 55 (1989) (describing the “banalisation of [in-
ternational] arbitration”); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coer-
cion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 934 (1999) (describing preva-
lence of arbitration clauses in routine transactions). 
52  See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 28–29 
(2004); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and 
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 53–54; 
Lynne Canning, Note, Have You Volunteered to Arbitrate Today?, 45 N.M. L. REV. 297, 
340–41 (2014). 
53  See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991); Doctor’s Assocs. Inc. 
v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 
265, 281 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991); Perry v. 
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). See generally Schwartz, supra note 52; See also 
Sternlight, supra note 20, at 676–77. 
54  See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Ar-
bitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 
895 (2008) (concluding that businesses include arbitration clauses in their contracts to pre-
clude consumer claims). Consumers rarely file in arbitration and when they do they almost 
always lose or do far worse than they would have in court. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL 
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) (2015) [hereinafter 
ARBITRATION STUDY]; Alexander J. S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitra-
tion: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIR. L. STUD. 1, 21 (2011). For more on the no-
tion that arbitration (specifically, an arbitration clause combined with a class-action ban) is 
the corporations’ “get out of jail free” card, see Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Ar-
bitration After Concepcion?, 60 KAN. L. REV. 767, 770, 776 (2012); Jessica Silver-
Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-
everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/C5H9-H7F8] (noting that it 
can be “nearly impossible for one individual to take on a corporation with vast resources,” 
and quoting federal judge William G. Young who suggested that “business has a good 
chance of opting out of the legal system altogether and misbehaving without reproach.”). 
55  The party who writes the arbitration clause into the contract almost always has a pre-
existing relationship with the arbitration provider. The repeat-player in arbitration is also the 
repeat-payer (to the arbitration provider). See ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 54, at 56–68; 
Stephen J. Choi et al., The Influence of Arbitrator Background and Representation on Arbi-
tration Outcomes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 43, 58 (2014); Colvin supra note 54, at 21; David 
Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Con-
sumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 111 (2015). The effect of the repeat-player problem is 
controversial. See Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer 
Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051, 1059–60 (2009); David 
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statutory rights.56 Thus, in contemporary arbitration jurisprudence, not one of 
The Bremen’s six facts is necessary to enforce an arbitration clause.57  
To be sure, the rationing of scarce judicial resources may be a necessary 
evil.58 But questions about when arbitration is an appropriate method of dispute 
resolution should include accurate data about civil caseloads. The “litigation 
explosion” that rocked the federal courts in the 1970s has abated. In fact, in the 
thirty-one years since 1985, there has been virtually no increase in the number 
of civil cases filed each year.59 In 1985 there were 273,670 new civil filings, 
and in 2016 there were 290,430 new civil filings.60 This represents an annual 
growth rate of less than one-fifth of 1 percent. Accordingly, promoters of arbi-
tration must defend it as a normative solution, rather than as a necessary ac-
commodation.61  
                                                                                                                                 
Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical 
Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1570 (2005); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations 
from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 256, 261 (2007); Stephen J. Ware, The 
Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 751–53 (2001). 
56  See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479–80 
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987); Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616, 640 (1985); Dean Witter 
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 215, 223–24 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 
U.S. 1, 16 (1984). See generally Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at 390 & n.44; Stephen J. 
Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 703 (1999). 
57  See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 
U. CIN. L. REV. 383 (2008). 
58  Talk of arbitration as a “necessary evil” is rare. In fact, the virtue of consent is now so 
deeply imbedded in American legal thought that arbitration is often presumed to be a univer-
sal good. Strong advocates of arbitration have come from both the political left and the polit-
ical right. See EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT 11 (2006) (discussing party autonomy as a core value in arbitration); Stephen 
N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1839, 1865 (2014) [hereinafter Fourth Era] (citing authorities about the liberal and 
conservative origins of alternative dispute resolution). For historical background about the 
Court’s romanticism of arbitration (that rivals others’ romanticism of litigation), see Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound 
and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 KAN. L. REV. 795, 817–19 (2012) (noting the absence of 
empirical data to support the Justices’ enthusiasm for arbitration); see also Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the De-
cline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1996). 
59  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-1 (1985–2016). 
60  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-1 (1985); id. (2016). 
For a more sophisticated account of the different ways that one might measure the growth in 
the civil caseload, see Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal Dis-
trict Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1235–36 (2015). 
61  For the defense of litigation, see generally ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 
(2017); Harry T. Edwards, Commentary, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anath-
ema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE 
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IV. WHO?: THE MINISTRATION OF POLICY 
Skeptics of arbitral policy and practice join a loud chorus of critics who are 
concerned about other aspects of contemporary federal litigation. Commenta-
tors complain about a flawed rulemaking process,62 how the disappearance of 
trials threatens our democracy,63 that case management is a menace,64 how the 
curtailment of class actions undermines law enforcement,65 and that multidis-
trict litigation cases are devouring the dockets.66 And those are just some of the 
warranted criticisms. Another batch of criticisms is familiar, even if empirically 
unfounded: cases take too long,67 the civil caseload is exploding,68 and discov-
ery is a widespread plague.69 
                                                                                                                                 
L.J. 1073 (1984); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979). 
62  See, e.g., STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean 
Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 
NEV. L.J. 1559, 1594 (2015); Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: 
A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 841–42 (1993); Brooke D. Coleman, Re-
covering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 
261, 276–78 (2009); Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rule-
making, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 452 (2013). 
63  See, e.g., SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES (2016); Mark W. Ben-
nett, Reinvigorating and Enhancing Jury Trials Through an Overdue Juror Bill of Rights: A 
Federal Trial Judge’s View, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 481, 490 (2016); Stephen B. Burbank & Ste-
phen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401 (2011). 
64  See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1117, 1123 (2009); Main, supra note 22, 1598–99; Todd D. Peterson, Re-
storing Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 41, 75 (1995); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 
424–31 (1982); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, Braking the Rules: Why State Courts 
Should Not Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 501, 509 (2016) [hereinafter Braking the Rules]; Fourth Era, supra note 58, at 
1885–88. 
65  See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 593, 594 (2012); Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income 
Litigants from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1536–37 (2016); Linda S. Mullenix, 
Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
511, 513 (2013); A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and De-
clining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 442 (2013). 
66  See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Reflections of a Recovering Aggregationist, 15 NEV. L.J. 
1455, 1469 (2015); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidis-
trict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 
109, 110 (2015); Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented 
Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1913–16 (2017). 
67  Notwithstanding the popularity of the narrative that cases languish in federal courts, in 
fact, for the past fifty-five years the time to disposition for the median civil case in federal 
court has consistently been about eight months, and has never been more than ten months. 
See Main supra note 22, at 1612–15. 
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This sundry list of real and perceived defects in federal litigation reminds 
us that the administration of civil justice is a highly complex system of inter-
connected components that integrates large numbers of participants, convoluted 
networks, and dynamic inputs. Critically, the arbitration kudzu vine occupies 
only part of this landscape. Reforms that do not consider the complexity of the 
system may not accomplish the desired result—or may have unintended collat-
eral consequences.70 
The complexity of civil justice reform is hardly a novel observation. But an 
intriguing question lurks: Who is considering this set of problems in the aggre-
gate? Put another way, who is managing the federal system of civil justice? 
Among the three branches of government, the Executive Branch surely 
bears the least responsibility.71 As the “largest consumer of judiciary services,” 
the federal government certainly plays an important role “in promoting the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of the civil justice system.”72 And of course adminis-
trative agencies are empowered to implement legislation through regulations.73 
                                                                                                                                 
68  Notwithstanding the popularity of the narrative that civil caseloads are growing at an un-
manageable rate, in fact, since 1985, there has been virtually no growth in the number of 
newly-filed civil cases. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 59 and accom-
panying text. 
69  Notwithstanding the popularity of the narrative that discovery is a widespread problem, in 
fact, in the vast bulk of cases there is no discovery or a non-controversial amount of discov-
ery. Discovery abuse is a serious problem in only the big cases, which constitute five percent 
to fifteen percent of the civil docket, but require a disproportionate amount of judicial re-
sources. See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive 
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 
1432 (1994) (discovery “not a problem in the majority of federal civil cases”); Linda S. Mul-
lenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 
683 (1998); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors 
of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 530–31 (2001); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Ge-
neric Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery “Reform,” 64 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 197 (2001); Fourth Era, supra note 58, at 1850 (citing Judith A. McKenna & Eliza-
beth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 791 (1998)); 
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the “Haves” a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery 
Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 246–49 & nn.109, 113, 123 (1999). 
70  Case management, for example, is a reform born of an effort to minimize costs and delay, 
yet it can have the opposite effect. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF 
JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 54–57 (1996). See 
generally Braking the Rules, supra note 64. 
71  U.S. CONST. art. II. But see infra note 83. 
72  Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute Resolution and the Vanishing Trial: Comparing 
Federal Government Litigation and ADR Outcomes, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 225, 232 
(2009). 
73  The role of federal (and even state) regulators with respect to arbitration is explored in 
Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1939 (2014); David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437 (2011). For 
the role of administrative agencies more generally, see Elena Kagan, Presidential Admin-
istration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989). 
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But in the main, the Executive Branch is enforcing law in furtherance of the 
public interest, rather than making the laws that ensure civil justice.74 
Next, the Legislative Branch surely bears at least some of the responsibility 
for the administration of civil justice.75 And over the years Congress has, for 
example, created the Legal Services Corporation,76 empowered a new layer of 
judicial officers,77 changed litigation incentives,78 institutionalized alternative 
dispute resolution,79 and responded to Supreme Court decisions.80 But Con-
gress’s interventions into the procedural realm are frequently myopic, misguid-
ed, clumsy, and/or unwelcome.81 Indeed, some self-awareness in this regard 
                                                        
74  See generally Theodore C. Hirt, Current Issues Involving the Defense of Congressional 
and Administrative Agency Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1377 (2000). 
75  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (allocating Congress authority to “constitute” courts). 
76  Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–355, § 1001, 88 Stat. 378 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1977)) (an effort to promote equal access to justice for 
low-income Americans). 
77  See, e.g., Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, Title I, § 101, 82 Stat. 
1108 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2009)) (an effort to improve the quality 
of justice and to expedite the disposition of the federal courts’ growing caseload). 
78  See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988) (an effort to encourage civil rights plaintiffs to file suits to 
enforce their rights). See also Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988) & 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988)) (allowing recov-
ery of attorneys’ fees by certain litigants who prevail in actions against the United States). 
79  See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, § 2(1), 112 Stat. 
2993 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658) (an effort to address caseload backlogs through 
“greater efficiency in achieving settlements”). 
80  See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 2000e) (noting that a purpose of the Act is “to respond to recent decisions 
of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to pro-
vide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.”); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, Pub. L.  No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 794a & 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e) (responding to a Supreme Court decision by relaxing the method for calculating 
statute of limitations). 
81  A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: 
A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1958). 
[L]egislatures have neither the immediate familiarity with the day-by-day practice of the courts 
which would allow them to isolate the pressing problems of procedural revision nor the experi-
ence and expertness necessary to the solution of these problems; legislatures are intolerably slow 
to act and cause even the slightest and most obviously necessary matter of procedural change to 
be long delayed; legislatures are subject to the influence of other pressures than those which seek 
the efficient administration of justice and may often push through some particular and ill-advised 
pet project of an influential legislator while the comprehensive, long-studied proposal of a bar 
association molders in committee; and legislatures are not held responsible in the public eye for 
the efficient administration of the courts and hence do not feel pressed to constant reexamination 
of procedural methods. 
Id. 
See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). See generally In re HP Inkjet Printer Litigation, 716 F.3d 
1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013) (“CAFA is poorly drafted” [with wording that is] “clumsy” and 
“bewildering.”); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1198 (11th Cir. 2007) (referring 
to CAFA’s mass action provisions as an “opaque, baroque maze of interlocking cross-
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might explain Congress’s delegating to the Supreme Court the task of prescrib-
ing “general rules of practice and procedure” for the federal courts.82 
Answering the question who is responsible for the administration of civil 
justice is complicated because it is not altogether clear where Congressional 
authority ends and interference with the judicial function begins.83 Overlapping 
                                                                                                                                 
references that defy easy interpretation”); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1441 
(2008); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and 
Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1554 (2008); Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action 
Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1654 (2006); Helen Norton, Re-
shaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Latest Challenge to Judicial Review, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1003, 1038 (2006); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in 
Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1823 (2008). 
See also Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 476). See generally Glenn S. Koppel, Populism, Politics, and Procedure: 
The Saga of Summary Judgment and the Rulemaking Process in California, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 
455, 482–83 (1997) (collecting and categorizing criticism of the CJRA); Carl Tobias, War-
ren Burger and the Administration of Justice, 41 VILL. L. REV. 505, 515–16 (1996) (“Nu-
merous federal judges considered the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 to be a congressional 
attempt at micro-managing the courts’ internal operations and, therefore, an unwarranted 
intrusion by a coordinate branch of government.”). 
See also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B)) (instituting heightened pleading require-
ments for plaintiffs in securities litigation). See generally Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. 
Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The United States of America, 
45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 703 (1997); Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 600 (2006); Arthur R. 
Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 11 (2010); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to 
Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 
960 (1999). 
82  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
83  See generally Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conven-
iens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147 (2006). See also 
Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separa-
tion of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1297–98 (1993) (Congress acts unconstitutionally 
when it “involv[es] itself deeply in the internal operations of the federal judiciary”); Martin 
H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 
MERCER L. REV. 697, 724–25 (1995) (Congressional involvement in federal rulemaking does 
not violate separation of powers); Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Re-
form Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1480 (1994) (“Court’s implied rulemaking authori-
ty, although generally recognized, should be subservient to Congress’ except where the 
Court exercises its power in defense of judicial authority or integrity.”); Gregory C. Sisk, 
The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Cir-
cuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 56 & n.263 (1997) (noting the “objection that congressional 
intervention in court procedures constitutes an unconstitutional intrusion upon the preroga-
tives of the independent Judicial Branch.”). 
Interestingly, the original version of the Civil Justice Reform Act (see Judicial Im-
provements Act of 1990) introduced by Senator Biden contained a proposed congressional 
finding that the “court, the litigants, and the litigants’ attorneys share responsibility for cost 
and delay in civil litigation and its impact on access to the courts and the ability of the civil 
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responsibility could mean double the attention is paid to the civil justice sys-
tem—or instead that neither branch is ultimately accountable. In either event, 
let us turn to the Judicial Branch. 
The Judicial Conference of the United States is responsible for policy-
making and administration of the federal judiciary.84 Its statutory mandate in-
cludes studying “the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and 
procedure” and proposing changes thereto.85 Its rulemaking committees, in 
turn, thus carry substantial responsibility for the administration of civil justice. 
Like its Congressional counterparts, the Advisory Committee has received 
sharp criticism for its reforms: 
[T]he rules committee acts in haste and is too slow; the committee fails to lead 
and innovate on things that matter, and engages in irresponsible experiments; the 
committee is obsessed with trivial wordsmithing and is dangerously politicized. 
Unfortunately, these oppositional pairs of criticism do not cancel each other out; 
instead, both halves are accurate, depending on the year and the specific reform 
at issue.86  
But more generally, the rulemaking process is also constrained in im-
portant ways. Procedural “rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right.”87 And more importantly, rulemakers can draft only “general 
rules.”88 As many commentators have emphasized, the generalizability of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is their original sin.89 This constraint handi-
                                                                                                                                 
justice system to provide proper and timely judicial relief for aggrieved parties.” S. REP. NO. 
101-416, at 1 (1990). In the final form of the Act, however, the finding was amended to pro-
vide that “the Congress and the executive branch” shared responsibility with courts, litigants 
and litigants’ attorneys for the problems identified. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-650, § 102(2), 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 476); R. Lawrence Dessem, 
Judicial Reporting Under the Civil Justice Reform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 687, 704 n.94 (1993). 
84  Governance and the Judicial Conference, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-
federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference [https://perma.cc/XAY2-LVUB] (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2018). 
85  28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012). 
86  Braking the Rules, supra note 64, at 503 (citing Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom 
About Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 449 (2013) (collecting cita-
tions)). 
87  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
88  Id. 
89  “General rules” has been construed as requiring trans-substantivity, meaning that one set 
of procedural rules must apply to all civil law suits no matter the size of the litigation, the 
stakes involved, or the substantive law at issue in the dispute. See David Marcus, The Past, 
Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 
371, 376–77 (2010); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An 
Essay on Adjusting the “One-Size-Fits-All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 378 
(2010). See also Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 535, 541–42 (2009) [hereinafter Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas] (chron-
icling how the original drafters of the Federal Rules did not discuss the issue of trans-
substantivity, but later endorsed it). 
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caps the rulemakers’ capacity to tailor solutions for the varied circumstances 
that the system of civil justice demands. Hensler and Khatam make this same 
point when critiquing the widespread judicialization of arbitration:90 a one-size-
fits-all approach fails to appreciate how different types of cases require differ-
ent procedures. 
Of course the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court occupies an im-
portant leadership role and, in that capacity, could reveal his broad vision for 
the administration of justice, could articulate a desired path for achieving that 
vision, and could hold himself and the system accountable for progress toward 
that vision.91 In fact, the Chief Justice is obliged to “submit to Congress an an-
                                                                                                                                 
The shortcomings of trans-substantive rules are well documented. See, e.g., Robert G. 
Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155, 
1159 (2006) (“[D]ifferent substantive policies sometimes justify different procedural choic-
es”); Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and 
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 713–15 (1988); Burbank, Pleading and the Di-
lemmas, supra, at 535 (explaining how trans-substantive rules adds unnecessary expense to 
smaller cases); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of 
the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Proce-
dure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 547 (1986) (describing the trans-substantive prem-
ise of the Rules as “unworkable”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the 
Future: Subrin’s New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss’s “Tolstoy Prob-
lem,” 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 77–97 (1994); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in 
Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 
27, 45–56 (1994) (making the case for substance-specific rules as a cost-saving measure for 
defense attorneys); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 344 (1989) (“[P]ublic law litigation appears to differ from 
private disputes in ways that call for distinctive consideration under certain and perhaps all 
of the Rules.”). 
Perhaps the fundamental concern with trans-substantive rules is that, in order for them 
to be trans-substantive, they must be drafted with such generality that they are not even rules 
at all. Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1987) 
(“Many of the Federal Rules authorize essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are trans-
substantive in only the most trivial sense.”). This creates a paradox where the rule’s lack of 
direction authorizes judicial discretion that itself undermines the goal of trans-substantivity. 
See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for 
Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 46 (1994) (“The price of trying 
to apply the same rules to all cases inevitably leads to general, vague, and flexible rules . . . 
provide very little guidance for the bar or bench.”); Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The 
Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 
1747 (1992). 
90  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at 383–87, 394-96, 406-07, 411–16. Unlike the con-
straint on federal rulemaking, the creeping judicialization of arbitration is de facto uniformi-
ty, not de jure. 
91  The Chief Justice has something of a bully pulpit. He can lobby Congress for funding or 
other procedural reform, but cannot pass the necessary legislation himself. He can influence 
the content of judicial education, but the judges do not necessarily need to follow his instruc-
tion. He can appoint the members of committees who write procedural rules, but the rule-
makers have their own agendas. He can, through case law, introduce judicial reform, but on-
ly when he can persuade a majority of the Court to join him. He does not possess a 
bureaucratic infrastructure that can be deployed reliably to achieve some desired civil justice 
reform. 
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nual report of the proceedings of the Judicial Conference and its recommenda-
tions for legislation.”92 Unfortunately, his “Year-End Reports on the Federal 
Judiciary” tend to be brief and are focused on one (or very few) narrow 
theme(s).93 To the extent that the Chief Justice has a vision for the civil justice 
system,94 he does not put it in these Reports. 
CONCLUSION 
If arbitration is good for something,95 it is for cases with factual circum-
stances like those in The Bremen. In that case, as reflected in all six of the key 
facts, the parties knowingly and voluntarily bargained away their right to go to 
court in exchange for something else. Contemporary arbitration case law is 
unmoored even from that type of inquiry.96 
                                                        
92  28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012). 
93  See Chief Justice’s Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary, U.S. SUP. CT., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx [https://perma.cc/S 
2F7-767M] (last visited Jan. 5, 2018). The Reports tend to be only about 3,000 words in 
length. The 2016 Report hails the distinguished public service and hard work routinely per-
formed by U.S. District judges. See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., U.S. SUPREME COURT, 2016 
YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (2016) [hereinafter ROBERTS, 2016 YEAR-
END REPORT]. The 2015 Year-End Report celebrated the 2015 amendments’ embrace of 
more aggressive judicial case management. See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., U.S. SUPREME 
COURT, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (2015) [hereinafter ROBERTS, 
2015 YEAR-END REPORT]. The 2014 Year-End Report focused on information technology in 
the U.S courts. See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., U.S. SUPREME COURT, 2014 YEAR-END REPORT ON 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3–4 (2014) [hereinafter ROBERTS, 2014 YEAR-END REPORT]. 
Moreover, in light of the fact that Chief Justice Roberts has criticized law professors for 
their self-indulgent scholarship, see Clip: A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts, C-
SPAN (June 25, 2011), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4460095/clip-conversation-chief-
justice-roberts [https://perma.cc/WX64-SRS9] (“Pick up a copy of any law review that you 
see, and the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on eviden-
tiary approaches in eighteenth-century Bulgaria, or something . . .”), it is interesting that his 
Reports tend to start with a fairly obscure historical teaser. For example, the first sentence of 
his 2016 Report stated: “As winter approached in late 1789, Justice David Sewall of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. . . .” ROBERTS, 2016 YEAR-END REPORT, supra, at 1. 
He began his 2015 Year-End Report with this sentence: “In 1838, John Lyde Wilson, a for-
mer Governor of South Carolina. . . .” ROBERTS, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra, at 1. His 
2014 Year-End Report began: “On November 10, 1893, the Washington Post identified an 
emerging technology. . . .” ROBERTS, 2014 YEAR-END REPORT, supra, at 1. 
94  See generally BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 62; Miller, supra note 81; Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence 
of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731 (2014); A. Benjamin Spencer, 
The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353 (2010). 
95  I am open to the possibility that it may not be. See supra note 25. 
96  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Un-
conscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counter-
weight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 757, 757–58 (2004). 
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To be sure, some form(s) of arbitration could be a component of our ongo-
ing effort to ensure access to justice.97 But it is our formal system, not arbitra-
tion itself, that determines arbitration’s scope, role, and ultimate destiny.98 In-
deed, contemporary “arbitration” is no less the responsibility of the formal 
system because it occurs informally, or in suburban office parks, or without ad-
versarial presentations, or without showing fidelity to the substantive law99—or 
when it does not occur at all because the obstacles to initiating arbitration pre-
vent parties from vindicating their rights.100 Arbitration occurs not merely in the 
shadow of formal adjudication; arbitrations occur under the auspices of a for-
mal system that must be held accountable. 
Structural hurdles complicate procedural reform, but the administration of 
a system of civil justice requires more than faithful stewards.101 We need em-
pirical data, honest critics, obsessive planners, and creative problem-solvers.102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
97  See supra notes 21–22. Naturally, many thoughtful commentators have outlined the vir-
tues of arbitration within a system of dispute resolution. See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, Con-
structions of Arbitration’s Informalism: Autonomy, Efficiency, and Justice, 2016 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 141, 142; Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 564 
(2001); Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbi-
tration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 777, 824 (2003); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitra-
tion Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259 (1990). Moreover, there is an infinite variety of 
dispute resolution proceedings that would meet the conventional definition of arbitration, to-
wit: “[A] binding adjudication of a dispute by private decision-makers outside a public court 
system.” See supra notes 6–7. Professor Stempel has observed that even arbitration’s repeat 
players have shown surprisingly little interest in shaping new forms of arbitration. Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Notes from a Quiet Corner: User Concerns About Reinsurance Arbitration—and 
Attendant Lessons for Selection of Dispute Resolutions Forums and Methods, 9 ARB. L. REV. 
93 (2017). (suggesting that there could be hybrids of arbitration and litigation that custom-
ized procedure to address concerns about arbitration). See also Michael A. Helfand, Arbitra-
tion’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration Paradigm, 124 YALE L.J. 2994, 3051 
(2015) (suggesting that religious arbitration offers a new paradigm for arbitration that allows 
parties to elevate the significance of shared values). 
98  See supra notes Parts II, III and accompanying text. 
99  See supra notes 8, 50 and accompanying text. 
100  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
101  See supra notes 62–94 and accompanying text. 
102  Accord Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at 386-87. 
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